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CHARGING FOR ROAD USE
Of course there is no escaping from the
impact of charging for road use. Area-
wide road user charging was first suc-
cessfully tried in Singapore in 1975 and
was introduced because during the
1970s there was very nearly full em-
ployment and the city was growing
very rapidly as a manufacturing and fi-
nancial hub. Incomes were rising and
people could see that traffic congestion
was getting worse. The problem was
that there was an absence of measures
to restrain car use. 
As a result, the Ministry of Commu-
nication decided to introduce an Area
Licensing Scheme (ALS), which was a
complete cordon around a Restricted
Zone (RZ) – effectively the Central Busi-
ness District area. Initially, motorists
entering through one of the 33 entry
points had to buy the coupons at
booths by the side of the road or at
petrol stations. The scheme was manu-
ally enforced, motorists had to display
a coupon in the windscreen which
were checked on entry to the restricted
zone (RZ) – which was effectively the
CBD area. The scheme operated be-
tween 7am and 7pm. Payment was a
fixed cost of $S3 a day.
The ALS worked but there were dis-
advantages. It was labour intensive and
therefore quite expensive to run. It was
difficult to alter the charges – as huge
print runs were required to print new
coupons – and this lack of flexibility
meant it was not possible to price ac-
cording to congestion levels. 
In 1998 therefore, the ALS system
was automated and in 1999 it was re-
placed with an electronic road pricing
system to reduce labour costs and to
allow for pricing to be used to reduce
congestion. Drivers must charge up a
smart card to insert into a meter on the
dashboard. This smart card is then deb-
ited every time the vehicle passes under
a gantry. If the card does not contain
enough credit or is not inserted into
the meter, then cameras record the reg-
istration plate details and a fine is auto-
matically sent to the motorist’s address.
This is based on 28 entry points of
the RZ. In addition, more gantries have
since been established at certain points
on the Outer Ring Road (ORR). This is
not a closed cordon and there is some
diversion of traffic. About ten gantries
are positioned at eight locations – four
or five are on the expressway. There are
17 locations altogether on the ORR. 
All of these points are being moni-
tored constantly, and new gantries are
only to be fitted on an ‘as and when’
basis. For example, on arterial routes
charges will be introduced or raised if
traffic speeds consistently fall below
20km/hr (optimal is 20-30km/hr),
while on the expressway speeds need to
fall below 45km/hr (optimal is 45-
65km/hr). Speeds are reviewed every
quarter, and if speeds are too high then
charges are lowered (too few cars) while
if speeds are too low then the charge is
introduced or raised. Any changes in
the ERP charging levels are announced
in the media one week before the
changeover period.
Crucially from a public acceptance
viewpoint, far more people pay less
through the ERP regime than under the
ALS. The maximum fee under ERP is
$S3 on the CTE (Central Expressway)
which is very congested during the
morning peak, and charges are usually
a lot less. The system also allows drivers
to alter their routes and time of travel.
To further enhance acceptability, re-
bates were granted to certain user
groups. For example, taxis were given
road tax rebates for the first three years
after implementation, while businesses
were given four years of rebates.
Overall, Electronic Road Pricing
raises $S80m annually – or about $S6m
a month. The money is paid into gen-
eral Government revenues, and is not
hypothecated to pay for public trans-
port as is sometimes reported.
RESTRICTING VEHICLE
OWNERSHIP
But, despite the success of restricting
city centre traffic through the ALS, in
1990 the Singaporean Government still
felt that the 6% a year growth of the car
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population was far too fast for the road
network to accommodate. Accordingly
it decided to regulate growth to 3% a
year, and introduced a Vehicle Quota
System (VQS) to achieve this. 
Initially, this system worked by taking
into account the de-registered vehicles
and then allowing 3% more licences.
Certificates of Entitlement (COE) were
then offered in eight categories. Cate-
gories one to four were based on size of
car, then there were motorcycles, goods
vehicles, buses and one open category.
This was reduced from 1999, and there
are now only two car categories, follow-
ing a review of the system. 
Each COE is valid for ten years, and on
expiry, the vehicle owner must renew the
COE paying the prevailing quota rate.
COEs are awarded through a competitive
bidding process. This was a closed process
until 2001, but is now open. Tenders can
now be submitted online. 
The current average cost of a COE is
about $S30,000, while the highest was
around $S100,000, with the rate de-
cided by the number of prospective cus-
tomers. The number of COEs to be
made available is announced at the
start of each financial year once the
‘number of vehicles on the road’ calcu-
lation has been made.
As well as paying for a COE, vehicle
owners in Singapore also face other ve-
hicle taxes. These include an import fee
worth 130% of the open market value
of the vehicle, an excise tax of 20% and
a registration fee of $S140, although
there is no purchase tax. Ongoing costs
are that petrol taxes are 35% of the
pump price and there is an annual road
tax bill of around $S1,200. Overall, for
a 1.6L engined car with an open mar-
ket value of around $S15,000, a
prospective car owner could expect to
pay around $S80,000, including
$S30,000 for the COE and about
$S20,000 for the import fee.
PARKING AND PLANNING
POLICY
One key area not often mentioned in
the story of the ALS and ERP, is the role
of parking policy, and policy relating to
private non residential spaces in partic-
ular. The Parking Places (Surcharge) Act
of October 1975 was designed to com-
plement the ALS (introduced in the
same year) in managing traffic levels in
the CBD by charging businesses a
monthly fee of $S60 a space on each
non-residential parking space. Total rev-
enue collected per year was $S40m, and
this was paid into the general govern-
ment revenue account. 
In the event, the Act was suspended
in September 1998 to help businesses
cut costs in the midst of the Asian Eco-
nomic recession, although most com-
mercial parking organisations contin-
ued to charge similar rates as before. A
second reason for dropping the sur-
charge was due to the adoption of the
ERP. This decision was taken because
ERP meant that it was possible to charge
motorists the full marginal cost of their
journeys in a more efficient way, but the
policy shift was also designed to help
sweeten the pill to businesses that may
otherwise have been hostile to the
change from ALS to ERP. Currently, busi-
nesses still pay a nominal $S1 per space
per month licence fee which raises
about $S1m a year. The Land Transport
Authority (LTA) pays the Urban Redevel-
opment Authority (URA) around
$S30,000 a month to administer it.
A second policy of interest, was de-
veloped during the 1970s to address the
specific issue of insufficient parking
spaces for Heavy Goods Vehicles
(HGV). The approach adopted is based
on the so called Garage Law (Parking
Places Law) which applies in parts of
Japan, whereby before one can buy a
car, one must have a registered parking
space and submit certification of such
to the authorities declaring the exis-
tence of such a space. In essence, when
an HGV licence is renewed, the owner
must produce a vehicle parking certifi-
cate proving that there is room to park
it in Singapore.
Public parking meanwhile, both on and
off street, is built and managed by the URA
and the Housing Development Board
(HDB) – which develops most high den-
sity public housing – while the LTA acts as
the parking authority. Effectively, a cum-
bersome administrative process means
that all HDB parking lots are charged at
the same rate, as are URA spaces (roadside
parking and open spaces).
With parking standards for new de-
velopments the level of policy innova-
tion is actually fairly low, with the key
principle being that every new develop-
ment is required to provide enough
parking to service its own needs. 
The level of parking required is de-
pendent on the nature of the develop-
ment (commercial office, commercial
retail, residential, industrial) and the
gross floor area (gfa) of the develop-
ment. Minimum parking standards are
enforced and developers may provide
additional parking if they wish. How-
ever, for non residential parking these
extra parking spaces must take up space
within the gross floor area allowance.
Singapore sees itself as being lucky be-
cause of the high proportion of new de-
velopments, meaning that enough new
parking can usually be provided.
But despite this very conservative
outlook on parking standards by the
URA, the responsible authority regard-
ing land use, parking provision stan-
dards have been progressively reduced
since the 1970s. This is due to the park-
ing occupancy rates (determined by reg-
ular surveys) on which the minimum
parking standards are based, falling due
to less traffic entering the central busi-
ness district thanks to the ALS, the ERP
and to better public transport (in partic-
ular the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit,
known as the SMRT). 
Interestingly, it is the developers that
are seen to be pushing for even lower
parking standards rather than the pub-
lic authority. Indeed, while there is a de-
sire to deregulate parking standards
among the transport authorities
(whereby developers would develop
parking as appropriate), the URA has so
far resisted this because it fears that de-
velopers would be tempted to use all of
its gfa for revenue generating activities,
whereas currently land for parking
spaces must be supplied in addition to
that for the gfa. In short, if parking
spaces were part of the gfa, there would
be far more of a risk of developers con-
verting under utilised parking spaces
into more profitable uses in the future –
which would be very difficult to con-
trol. In practice though, this already
happens to a limited extent, ie develop-
ers submit an application to cut their
minimum parking quotas so as to in-
crease their gfa when the minimum
parking levels for the newest develop-
ments are reduced. 
Meanwhile at the strategic level, the
Concept Plan of Singapore sets out the
long range development (40-50 year
horizon) plan for the country. This pro-
jects a population of 4m occupying 70%
of the island. It proposes the decentrali-
sation of the present CBD to four new
regional centres of Jurong East, Wood-
lands, Seletar and Tampines, complete
with housing, recreational and employ-
ment needs. Since the implementation
of the 1971 plan, land use zoning con-
trols have been administered by the
URA via stipulations in its Master Plans.
This plan is aided by the fact that the
Government owns most of the land in
Singapore, and whereas previously
most landed properties (houses) were
freehold, increasingly only 99 year
leases are being offered. Such a strong
land use planning basis has allowed a
number of core corridors to be devel-
oped to a density high enough to sup-
port the Singapore Mass Rapid Transit
network, a high quality public transport
system which really does provide a gen-
uine alternative to those who have been
‘persuaded’ not to drive – and the devel-
opment of which is still continuing
apace. The SMRT now spans the island,
and is supported by light rail lines 
and bus routes for less heavily trafficked
corridors. 
CONCLUSIONS
At this point it should be noted that
there are several areas where Singapore
is not as progressive as some other
cities. For example, where pedestrians
must cross the road at traffic signals
they invariably must wait for a long
time. This is partly because there is a
feeling that motorists are not to be in-
convenienced – they have paid for the
road space after all and deserve a high
quality of service as a result. Neverthe-
less, the objective to reduce road traffic
in the city centre has been met and
maintained for a quarter of a century.
No other traffic management system in
the world has achieved anything like
this performance over such a period. 
Yet despite this success, no other city
has attempted to follow the same path.
This has often been attributed to several
quirky features of the Singaporean situ-
ation, that have been seen not only to
hinder but to totally prevent any mean-
ingful policy lessons being transferred
elsewhere. In many respects such reti-
cence is valid as there have been a num-
ber of very specific and even unique cir-
cumstances that have played a major
part in the success of the Singapore
story. For instance, the political and
economic situation has meant that citi-
zens of Singapore are largely law-abid-
ing, and very respectful of authority,
trusting the Government to make deci-
sions in the national interest. Singapore
is also a very densely populated island,
and there are no nearby cities to attract
businesses to relocate, while internally
the national land use plan prevents de-
velopers from playing off competing
planning authorities against one an-
other. Finally, road pricing is seen to
have been implemented as part of an
extremely punitive regime of restricting
automobile use and ownership, while
there has been a very high level of pub-
lic investment put into its metro system
and extensive bus network.
In truth, this is not the whole story.
Instead, the reasons that the ERP was
implemented with relatively little fuss
was most probably due to the fact that
many of the prospective losers (taxi
drivers, local businesses etc) were ef-
fectively ‘bribed’ with road tax rebates
for a certain number of years and with
a huge reduction in the parking sur-
charge. Furthermore, ordinary users
were almost guaranteed to pay less
money than previously under the ALS
– more a case of enlightened self inter-
est than of the usual image of meekly
accepting transport users and surely
an implementation strategy worth
considering elsewhere. 
The second point seems to indicate
that strong regional land use plans over
a very long period (albeit in a rapidly
growing economy) can allow public
transport rather than the car to shape
land use patterns, resulting in econom-
ically viable and attractive public trans-
port system and a far more efficient
road network. This would seem to
strengthen the case for strong long-
term regional land use plans where de-
velopment is focused in a way that
favours public transport over the car.
Closely related to this is the fact
that significant improvements to the
public transport system have been car-
ried out at the same time as the restric-
tions on road traffic have been intro-
duced. For many people therefore,
owning a car is not the necessity it
might be elsewhere, ie public trans-
port really is a viable alternative for
the majority of journeys.
Lastly, the role of parking policies,
particularly the levy on private non
residential spaces, has almost certainly
led to businesses encouraging their
staff not to drive to work wherever
possible, with the evidence for this
being that developers are far keener to
provide more revenue generating gross
floor area than car parking spaces. 
In summary, the Singaporean park-
ing and development policies have
been little known but key elements in
the traffic management strategy over a
number of years, although with the
adoption of the ERP and COE schemes
its relative importance as seen by pol-
icy makers has diminished somewhat.
However, in cities where road pricing
and vehicle rationing are less likely to
be adopted (ie the vast majority), such
innovative policies could well offer a
less high profile and thus less more
politically acceptable approach to-
wards limiting traffic. 
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